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COURT REPORTS

Milliken v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., No. E029724, 2002 Cal. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 2541 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2002) (holding an
environmental impact report is adequate if it: (1) properly describes a
project's environmental setting and scope; (2) adequately analyzes a
project's impact on groundwater quality; (3) adequately analyzes a
reasonable range of alternatives and properly rejects each alternative;
and (4) is consistent with the applicable zoning and land use laws).
The plaintiff, Bradley Milliken, appealed a Superior Court of
Riverside County order to the Fourth Appellate District of the
California Court of Appeals. The order denied Milliken's petition for
a writ of mandate to prohibit the defendant, the Coachella Valley
Water District ("District"), from certifying an environmental impact
report ("EIR") and expanding its Water Reclamation Plant ("Plant").
Milliken appealed from an order that denied a writ of mandate to
set aside the actions of the District in certifying an EIR and approving
plans to expand its Plant. The District proposed to increase the Plant's
wastewater collection, reclamation, and disposal capacity from 2.5 to
5.0 million gallons per day ("mgd"): In order to achieve the proposed
increase, the District planned to upgrade the Plant's facilities and
build two more percolation ponds. The proposed location for the
ponds was a 105-acre parcel north of the Plant and on the upstream
side of a United States Bureau of Reclamation flood control dike.
Milliken's family owned a date farm and residence north of the Plant
site and southeast of the pond site. A portion of Milliken's land was an
agricultural preserve under the Williamson Act.
The Plant originally consisted of a 1.0 mgd aerated lagoon
treatment facility with on-site percolation pond disposal. In 1995, the
District completed construction of a 2.5 mgd extended aeration facility
with tertiary and biosolids handling facilities at the Plant. The District
proposed several upgrades including headworks, an aeration basin and
blower, two secondary clarifiers, and a pump to transport treated
effluent (recycled wastewater for irrigation) to new ponds. The
District intended the project to provide treatment of increased sewage
flows until 2017.
Milliken appealed the District's certification of the EIR to the court
based on five arguments: (1) the EIR failed to adequately describe the
project's environmental setting; (2) the EIR failed to describe the
project's true scope as a segment of a larger unstated project; (3) the
EIR failed to analyze the project's potential impacts on water quality;
(4) the EIR failed to consider alternatives and rejected each alternative
based only on cost; and (5) the project's purpose was inconsistent with
zoning and land use laws and would have significant impacts on land
use.
The court began its analysis by stating Milliken had the burden of
proving the EIR was inadequate. In response to Milliken's first claim,
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the court stated the EIR adequately described all land uses in the area
of the Plant. Further, the EIR contained extensive information about
the area's weather and wind conditions. The court then concluded
the EIR specifically described Milliken's land, the exact location of
Milliken's residence in relation to the Plant and the pond site, and the
wind conditions near the project. The EIR also acknowledged one
alternative pipe line might cross Milliken's property and that some of
Milliken's property had been removed from agricultural reserve status.
Milliken relied on two other cases where the court held an EIR as
inadequate. However, the court distinguished the prior cases, where
the court found EIR lacked sufficient explanation or detail regarding
the surroundings, from the present case and concluded the EIR
sufficiently described in detail the project's environmental setting.
Second, Milliken asserted the project's true scope was 20.0 mgd,
not 5.0 mgd as stated in the EIR. The District argued any expansion of
the Plant above 5.0 mgd was not foreseeable, thus no analysis of the
effects of future expansions was needed. Milliken provided no
evidence to show the EIR understated the project or concealed the
ultimate capacity of 20.0 mgd. The EIR based its estimated scope on
population growth according to census tract figures, which were not
disputed by Milliken.
Furthermore, Milliken claimed the project sized its headworks for
8.5 mgd. According to Milliken, the headworks size proved the
ultimate capacity of 20.0 mgd. Contrary to Milliken's assertions, the
court concluded the 8.5 mgd headwork proposed by the District did
not necessarily mean the Plant expansion was planned to be 20.0 mgd.
The court found Milliken overestimated the importance of the 8.5
mgd headworks and ignored evidence the Plant's overall operating
capacity was 5.0 mgd. Milliken claimed a 1993 interoffice District
memorandum showed the true scope of the project was 20.0 mgd.
The court held Milliken misread the 1993 memorandum and later
interoffice communications clarified Milliken's misunderstanding.
Milliken also claimed the average daily influent to the Plant increased
by 222 percent between 1994 and 1999, which proved the true scope of
the project was 20.0 mgd. The court dismissed Milliken's second
argument and stated the evidence did not prove the 222 percent
growth rate would continue in the future.
Third, Milliken maintained the EIR did not adequately analyze the
possible contamination of the groundwater in the area of the Plant,
including water in Milliken's well. In contrast, the District claimed the
EIR adequately analyzed possible groundwater contamination and the
EIR properly concluded the project would have no significant impact
on the groundwater quality. The court reasoned an EIR's analysis
should be specific enough to allow informed decision making and
public participation. The EIR should also include information about a
project's environmental impacts and reasonable alternatives. Based on
test results from a monitoring well and an irrigation well, the EIR
concluded there would not be a significant affect on the quality of the
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groundwater.
Further, there was no evidence of effluent
contamination in Milliken's well. The court held the EIR adequately
analyzed the project's affect on groundwater surrounding the Plant
and substantial evidence supported the EIR's conclusions.
Milliken also argued the EIR failed to include evidence of past
groundwater contamination at the Plant.
Results of quarterly
groundwater tests were part of the public record, even though the EIR
and administrative record did not include the results. The court
found Milliken failed to prove the EIR's lack of test results misled the
District, the public, understated any problem, or was prejudicial.
Fourth, Milliken claimed the EIR did not adequately analyze
alternatives to the project and the District chose this project based only
on its low cost. An EIR must provide sufficient information about each
alternative in order to permit evaluation, analysis, and comparison to
the proposed project. The EIR analyzed seven alternatives to the
proposed project and thoroughly explained the reasons why each
alternative was rejected. The court held the EIR adequately analyzed a
reasonable range of alternatives. The court found that the District
rejected each alternative for an environmental or a technological
reason, rather than cost alone.
Finally, Milliken asserted the project would significantly impact
land uses, since it was inconsistent with Riverside County's and the City
of Indio's zoning ordinances, and the Riverside County
Comprehensive General Plan. The county zoned the Plant and pond
site under the W-2 zoning ordinance. Uses permitted under the W-2
zoning included: water works facilities (public and private) for the
primary purpose of production and distribution of water for irrigation
purposes, public utility uses such as structures and installations
necessary for conservation, and development of water (dams,
pipelines, water conduits, tanks, reservoirs, and wells).
Milliken
argued the project was inconsistent with the W-2 zoning, because the
project did not produce and distribute water for irrigation purposes.
Milliken also claimed the project was not necessary to the conservation
and development of water. According to Milliken, the project's main
purpose was wastewater disposal. The court found the project would
expand the Plant's capacity to produce and distribute recycled water
for irrigation and conservation.
The court held Milliken's
interpretation of uses under W-2 zoning was too narrow. Accordingly,
Milliken failed to show the project's inconsistency with the city's
ordinance.
Milliken then presented an argument the project was inconsistent
with the Western Coachella Valley Plan ("WCVP").
The WCVP
provides rivers, floodways, lakes, and reservoirs are limited to open
space and limited recreational land uses. Since the pond site would be
located in a floodway, Milliken claimed the percolation ponds did not
preserve or maintain open space. However, the court held Milliken
disregarded section 1.5 (a) of the WCVP, which provided several
reasons a public service facility may be consistent with all land use
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designations under the WCVP. The reasons included: the facility
would not create a land use problem, the site had adequate
circulation, water distribution, sewage collection and utility service,
and the location would notjeopardize public health, safety and welfare
or the facility was necessary to ensure public safety and welfare. The
project satisfied all the requirements under the WCVP, therefore the
court held it was consistent with the WCVP.
The court affirmed the District's decision and concluded the EIR
adequately described the project's environmental setting and scope,
adequately analyzed the project's impacts on groundwater quality and
reasonable alternatives, and Milliken failed to show the project was
inconsistent with zoning or land use laws.
Susan Curtis
State ex reL. Dept. of Parks & Recreation v. Schoendorf, No. H022039,
2002 WL 972147 (Cal. Ct. App. May 10, 2002) (holding: (1) a claim of
adverse use cannot be supported where a water right was used with
implied permission that was never expressly disclaimed; and (2) a
property owner may only rely on an overlying water right to extract
water from the ground beneath the owner's property, not to divert
surface flow to which the owner has no riparian right).
The Schoendorfs appealed an action alleging they illegally diverted
surface flow of a spring from land owned by the State of California.
Schoendorf claimed prescriptive and overlying rights to the spring.
On summary adjudication, the Monterey County Superior Court ruled
in the state's favor. Schoendorf appealed, alleging the trial court
erred in failing to infer adverse use and improperly adjudicating their
overlying right claim. The California Court of Appeal for the Sixth
District affirmed the trial court's ruling.
The surface flow of the spring arose on the state's land and only
reached Schoendorf's property by means of a springbox and pipeline.
From 1944 to 1954, Schoendorf's predecessor in interest used this
diversion to supply their property with water. The state gained title to
the waters of the spring and surrounding land in 1962. In 1996,
Schoendorf installed a new springbox and pipeline on the state's land
after acquiring neighboring property.
In 1999, the state brought an action against Schoendorf alleging
they were illegally diverting water from the spring. The state also
claimed sole riparian rights to the spring because without the
diversion, no water from the spring would reach Schoendorf's
property. The state sought removal of the diversion and restoration of
its property, as well as a declaration that Schoendorfs diversion was
illegal. Schoendorf filed a cross-complaint seeking declaratory relief.
They alleged a prescriptive right to the spring based on adverse use by

